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GENERAL JURISDICTION 2.0:  THE UPDATING AND 
UPROOTING OF THE CORPORATE PRESENCE 
DOCTRINE 
Edward D. Cavanagh 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For well over a century, state courts have exercised personal jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations if they engage in commerce within the state “not occasionally 
or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.”1  This assertion 
of judicial power, referred to as general jurisdiction2 and also as the corporate 
presence doctrine,3 permitted courts to entertain claims that had no nexus with the 
forum state4 against foreign companies “doing business” within that state.5  The 
United States Supreme Court, however, sent this line of cases “careening into the 
abyss”6 in Daimler AG v. Bauman,7 wherein the Court held that “the exercise of 
general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial, 
continuous, and systematic course of business’ . . . is unacceptably grasping.”8  
Redefining general jurisdiction, the Court ruled that a foreign corporation may be 
sued on a claim arising outside the forum state only where the foreign corporation 
can be said to be “at home” in the forum state.9  Absent exceptional circumstances, 
“at home” means the state of incorporation or the state of defendant’s principal 
place of business.10 
Not since the wholesale dismantling of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer v. 
Heitner11 has the Supreme Court acted so dramatically and decisively to curtail the 
                                                                                                     
   Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law.  A.B., University of Notre Dame; J.D. 
Cornell Law School; LL.M. and J.S.D. Columbia Law School. 
 1.  Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267 (1917). 
 2.  Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 
79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-44 (1966). 
 3.  In EED Holdings v. Palmer Johnson Acquisition Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271-72 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004), the court described the corporate presence doctrine as follows: 
Pursuant to case law codified by section 301 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules 
(“CPLR”), an unlicensed foreign corporation is subject to the general personal 
jurisdiction of the courts of New York if such corporation is “doing business” in the state.  
A defendant corporation is deemed to be “doing business” in New York if it has engaged 
in “such a continuous and systematic course of [business] here that a finding of its 
‘presence’ in this jurisdiction is warranted[.]” 
(citations omitted). 
 4.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011); see 
generally DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 82 (5th ed. 2011). 
 5.  EED Holdings, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 271-72. 
 6.  David D. Siegel, U.S. Supreme Court Severely Circumscribes “Presence” as Basis for Personal 
Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporation, SIEGEL’S PRAC. REV. Jan. 2014, at 1. 
 7.  134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 8.  Id. at 761 (citation omitted). 
 9.  Id. at 769 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 10.  Id. at 760. 
 11.  433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
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exercise of jurisdiction under a long-recognized legal doctrine.  In the ongoing 
battle between plaintiffs for access to the courts and defendants for fairness, 
Daimler has given the defendants a leg up. 
In the wake of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,12 the principal focus of 
jurisdictional analysis has been specific jurisdiction; that is, jurisdiction based on 
claims arising out of defendant’s activities within the forum state.  As a result, 
“general jurisdiction has come to occupy a less dominant place in the contemporary 
scheme.”13  Still, the Court in Daimler, focusing on the international aspects of the 
case, saw the need to rein in the exercise of general jurisdiction; otherwise, a 
foreign corporation could be sued everywhere that it had substantial business 
interests.14  Daimler will severely curb, if not eliminate from the American courts, 
suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants arising outside of the United 
States.  Where there is a United States nexus—an American defendant or a claim 
arising here—the Daimler decision will likely be of less import, especially since 
Daimler makes clear that an American defendant can always be sued where the 
claim arises as well as in its state of incorporation or principal place of business.15 
Nevertheless, the decision is bound to invite future litigation.  The Daimler 
Court avoided the question of whether the acts of a subsidiary in the forum state 
should be imputed to the parent for jurisdictional purposes.16  The Court was 
unclear on the facts needed to establish exceptional circumstances that would 
permit the exercise of general jurisdiction in a forum other than defendant’s state of 
incorporation or principal place of business.  The Court was also unclear on the 
extent to which fairness considerations are relevant in deciding whether general 
jurisdiction is proper.  In short, Daimler is most likely not the last word on general 
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court. 
This article will (1) trace the evolution of general jurisdiction; (2) analyze the 
Daimler holding; (3) examine the impact of Daimler; and (4) discuss issues 
regarding general jurisdiction that courts must resolve going forward. 
II. EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
A. Common Law 
The common law recognized only two bases for the exercise of in personam 
jurisdiction: presence and consent.17  Jurisdiction based on presence turned on 
whether the defendant had been served with process while physically present 
within the bounds of the bailiwick.  Pennoyer v. Neff18 is the seminal case on 
personal jurisdiction in the United States.  There, the Supreme Court embraced the 
common law’s theory of territoriality governing the exercise of personal 
                                                                                                     
 12.  526 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 13.  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758. 
 14.  Id. at 760-61. 
 15.  Id. at 761. 
 16.  Id. at 759-60. 
 17.  For in personam jurisdiction to attach, a defendant “must be brought within [the court’s] 
jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.”  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 
 18.  Id. 
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jurisdiction.19  In holding that Oregon courts lacked jurisdiction over a California 
resident who had been served with process via publication in a local Oregon 
newspaper, the Court stated “that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”20  Conversely, “no 
tribunal established by [the State] can extend its process beyond [its] territory so as 
to subject either persons or property to its decisions.”21  Any attempt to do so “is a 
mere nullity, and incapable of binding” persons or property outside of the State.22 
Thus, at common law, physical power over the defendant provided the basis 
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  A state was all-powerful with respect to 
defendants served with process within the physical bounds of its territory.  On the 
other hand, a state had no power with respect to a defendant located outside of its 
bounds.  Under the common law approach, any attempt to exercise jurisdiction over 
a defendant located outside the physical boundaries of the forum was viewed as an 
affront to the sovereignty of a sister state.23   
Consent, on the other hand, was a more flexible concept.  Consent could be 
express or implied and could be manifested in several ways.24  Express consent 
may be created by the execution of a forum selection clause in a contract.25  
Implied consent exists where a defendant files a notice of appearance or simply 
participates in the proceedings, without challenging personal jurisdiction, in which 
case any objection to personal jurisdiction is deemed waived.26  Consent need not 
be voluntary and may be exacted by the state.27  For instance, states typically 
require foreign corporations to appoint a state officer as an agent for service of 
process and thus to submit to personal jurisdiction as a condition of being granted 
license to do business in a given state.28 
B. Erosion of Limiting Common Law Principles and Expansion of Personal 
Jurisdiction 
As the twentieth century dawned, it became increasingly apparent that the 
restrictive common law rules governing personal jurisdiction no longer meshed 
with the needs of a changing society.  In the early 1900s, America was in the state 
of transition.  The automobile made it easy for people to move from place to place; 
no longer were people anchored for life to their birth places.  The pace of 
urbanization of America, which had begun in the nineteenth century, accelerated as 
                                                                                                     
 19.  Id. at 722. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. at 722-23. 
 23.  Id. at 723-24. 
 24.  See R.R. Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 65, 81 (1870). 
 25.  Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964). 
 26.  Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp. Inc. v. Comm. of Receivers for A.W. Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 
1375, 1389 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F. 2d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
 27.  St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (“The state may, therefore, impose as a condition 
upon which a foreign corporation shall be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall 
stipulate that in any litigation arising out of its transactions in the state, it will accept as sufficient the 
service of process on its agents or persons specially designated, and the condition would be eminently fit 
and just.”). 
 28.  N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1314 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2016, chapter 1). 
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immigrants flocked to the United States and soldiers returned from fighting the 
First World War29 in Europe. 
The introduction of the automobile in the twentieth century underscored the 
inadequacies of the common law’s restrictive approach to personal jurisdiction.  
For example, a New Jersey resident could drive an automobile into New York, 
negligently cause a collision on New York roads that gave rise to both personal 
injuries and property damage to New York citizens, but under Pennoyer, still not be 
answerable in the New York courts by simply driving back to New Jersey and not 
returning to New York.  Beginning in 1923, state legislatures then undertook to 
protect their citizens by enacting non-resident motor vehicle statutes.30  For 
example, New York’s Vehicle and Traffic law, enacted in 1929, would make a New 
Jersey driver answerable in a New York court for harm caused to New York 
residents by its negligent acts in New York.31  Today, non-resident motor vehicle 
statutes are universal.32 
These statutes, which sustained the exercise of personal jurisdiction beyond the 
bounds set by Pennoyer, were tested in the courts.  The United States Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of non-resident motor vehicle statutes in Hess v. 
Pawloski.33  Hess involved an action in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts plaintiff 
who had been injured when hit by a car driven in Massachusetts by the defendant, a 
Pennsylvania domiciliary.34  Jurisdiction was based on a Massachusetts statute 
which provided that the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles is deemed as a 
matter of law to be the agent for service of process for any out-of-state driver sued 
in Massachusetts courts for negligent operation of a motor vehicle on the 
Massachusetts roads and that an action against any out-of-state driver so accused 
may be commenced by service of process on the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.35  
The Massachusetts statute further required the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to 
forward a copy of the summons and complaint via registered mail to the defendant, 
and the Commissioner in Hess did so.36 
Plaintiff thus complied with the statute and although the defendant had notice 
of the lawsuit, he nevertheless challenged the jurisdiction as void under Pennoyer 
because Massachusetts process was served outside of Massachusetts boundaries.37  
The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that jurisdiction was proper, even under 
Pennoyer, because defendant had impliedly consented to Massachusetts 
jurisdiction by using Massachusetts roads,38 was properly served through a 
statutory agent, and had actual notice of the lawsuit.39  In so ruling, the Court noted 
                                                                                                     
 29.  Indeed, a popular post-World War I song was entitled “How Ya Gonna Keep ‘em Down on the 
Farm (After They’ve Seen Paree).” 
 30.  See Marshall J. Jox, Non-Resident Motorists Service of Process Act, 33 F.R.D. 151, 153 (1963-
1964). 
 31.  See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 253-54 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2016, chapter 1).   
 32.  Jox, supra note 30, at 153. 
 33.  274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
 34.  Id. at 353. 
 35.  Id. at 353-54. 
 36.  Id. at 354. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 356. 
 39.  Id. 
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that automobiles are “dangerous machines” that pose “serious dangers to persons 
and property,” and that a state may make and enforce reasonable regulations to 
promote due cause on the part of residents and non-residents alike in driving on 
state highways.40 
Arguably, the implied consent theory stressed in the Hess opinion was merely 
an incremental expansion of existing personal jurisdiction standards set forth in 
Pennoyer.  After all, Pennoyer recognized the validity of consent-based 
jurisdiction.  Clearly, however, Hess involved much more than consent.  Implied 
consent was a mere legal fiction.  If Hess truly turned on implied consent, then out-
of-state motorists who expressly stated (in writing or otherwise) that they were not 
consenting to personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts by using the roads there could 
not, and would not, be deemed to have impliedly consented to Massachusetts 
jurisdiction.  Express statements supersede implied statements.  In Hess, however, 
no amount of actual protest of Massachusetts jurisdiction by the defendant would 
have changed the result.  The real basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in Hess was 
not consent, but rather the defendant’s commission of a tortious act in 
Massachusetts.41  The Hess ruling thus foreshadowed the major changes in 
jurisdictional rules that were down the road. 
In addition to enacting non-resident motor vehicle statutes, legislators also 
sought to expand on common law principles by passing laws that would make 
domiciliaries of a state subject to jurisdiction in that state, even if personally served 
elsewhere.42  Although domicile is only a stone’s throw from presence and hence 
only a modest extension of a forum’s jurisdictional reach, the issue was litigated up 
to the Supreme Court, in Milliken v. Meyer.43  There, the Supreme Court held that 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on the defendant’s domicile did not 
offend due process.44  The case involved a commercial dispute between the 
parties.45  Milliken commenced an action in Wyoming state court seeking 
cancellation of alleged contracts with Meyer and for an accounting.46  Jurisdiction 
over Meyer was premised on a Wyoming statute authorizing the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over Wyoming domiciliaries.47  Meyer was personally served 
with Wyoming process in Colorado.48  Meyer did not appear in the Wyoming 
                                                                                                     
 40.  Id. 
 41.  In Oberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953), Justice Frankfurter underscored 
the fact that the consent theory in Hess was legal fiction, stating: 
It is true that in order to ease the process by which new decisions are fitted into pre-
existing modes of analysis there has been some fictive talk to the effect that the reason 
why a non-resident can be subjected to a state’s jurisdiction is that the non-resident has 
“impliedly” consented to be sued there.  In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these 
cases does not rest on consent at all.  The defendant may protest to high heaven his 
unwillingness to be sued and it avails him not. 
(citation omitted). 
 42.  See generally Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction to Render Personal Judgment Against Absent 
Domiciliary. Personal Service Outside the State, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 724 (1941).  
 43.  311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
 44.  Id. at 463-64. 
 45.  Id. at 459-60. 
 46.  Id. at 459. 
 47.  Id. at 461. 
 48.  Id. at 459. 
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action, and the court entered a default judgment.49  Thereafter, Meyer brought an 
action in Colorado seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Wyoming judgment for 
lack of in personam jurisdiction, claiming that service of Wyoming process on him 
in Colorado did not confer jurisdiction and that any judgment rendered thereon 
violated due process.50 
The Colorado trial court agreed with Milliken and dismissed Meyer’s attempt 
to collaterally attack the Wyoming judgment.51  The Colorado Supreme Court, 
without passing on the jurisdictional issue, reversed “because of an irreconcilable 
contradiction between the findings and the decree.”52  The United States Supreme 
Court reversed and upheld the Wyoming judgment.53 
First, the Court held that “[d]omicile in the state alone is sufficient to bring an 
absent defendant within the reach of the state’s jurisdiction for purposes of a 
personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service.”54  In so holding, 
the Court found that “the authority of a state over one of its citizens is not 
terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state.”55  The Court explained 
that a domiciliary, though absent from a state, still enjoys the benefits of 
citizenship.56  Enjoyment of the privileges of domicile creates reciprocal duties on 
the domiciliary’s part, including the duty to answer any claim lodged against it in 
the courts of its domicile.57 
Second, the Supreme Court rejected Meyer’s argument that extraterritorial 
service of Wyoming process violated the due process clause.58  The Court held that 
Meyer, having been personally served with process in Colorado, had actual notice 
of the lawsuit and that such service had met the due process standard of “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”59 
C. The Revolution:  International Shoe 
The Supreme Court ushered in the modern era of jurisdictional analysis with 
its landmark decision in International Shoe.60  In that case, the State of Washington 
sued International Shoe, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business 
in Missouri, for unpaid contributions to the state’s unemployment compensation 
fund.61  International Shoe denied any liability for employment taxes, claiming that 
it was not doing business in Washington and had no employees there.62  The record 
revealed International Shoe’s carefully constructed business model for conducting 
its Washington activities, specifically designed to avoid any claims for payment 
                                                                                                     
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 460. 
 51.  Id. at 458. 
 52.  Id. at 461. 
 53.  Id. at 462. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 463. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 463-64. 
 58.  Id. at 462-63. 
 59.  Id. at 463. 
 60.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 61.  Id. at 311-12. 
 62.  Id. at 312. 
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under Washington’s unemployment tax and to provide a factual basis supporting its 
claims that it was not doing business in Washington.63 
Thus, International Shoe: 
 Had no employees in Washington but sold its goods through a network 
of independent agents; 
 paid no wages to these agents, but rather paid them commissions based 
on orders obtained; 
 had no offices in Washington, but did rent hotel rooms and other space 
where its agents could display International Shoe wares; 
 made no sales within the state of Washington but instead took orders for 
shoes from customers; those orders were processed and approved at the 
home office in Missouri; 
 maintained no inventory within the state but periodically displayed its 
line of shoes for prospective customers in local hotel rooms; 
 made no deliveries in intrastate commerce; all goods were shipped into 
Washington via common carrier from Missouri; 
 maintained no bank accounts in Washington; and 
 salesmen had no power over the price of goods offered by International 
Shoe.64 
On the other hand, additional facts suggested a significant presence within the 
state: 
 International Shoe maintained a sales force of eleven to thirteen 
individuals to display shoes in Washington and to receive orders; 
 the sales force was paid on the basis of commissions earned on sales 
made within Washington; 
 all sales personnel lived in Washington; and 
 their sales territories were confined to Washington.65 
In short, International Shoe argued that it was not doing business in 
Washington and that, at most, it was merely soliciting business, which would not 
have been enough to subject the company to the jurisdiction of the State of 
Washington under Pennoyer and its progeny.66  The Supreme Court rejected that 
reasoning, focused on the substance rather than on the form of International Shoe’s 
business model, and reformulated the constitutional standards governing a state’s 
assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign business entity, stating: 
Now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of 
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject 
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of 
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”67 
In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the formalistic standards enunciated in 
Pennoyer, which focused on territoriality and physical power over the defendant, in 
                                                                                                     
 63.  Id. at 313-14. 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. at 313-15. 
 66.  Id. at 315-16. 
 67.  Id. at 316. 
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favor of a more flexible standard based on the defendant’s “minimum contacts” 
with the state and fairness.68  The test “cannot be simply mechanical or 
quantitative;”69 rather, the question of “[w]hether due process is satisfied must 
depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and 
orderly administration of the laws of which it was the purpose of the due process 
clause to insure.”70  Whether or not there are minimum contacts with the forum 
state thus turns on two factors: (1) the systematic and continuous nature of the 
activity in the forum state; and (2) the relationship between that activity and the 
claim for relief asserted by the plaintiff.71  This, in turn, creates a matrix consisting 
of four areas of analysis: 
Area 1 - no systematic and continuous activities and the cause of action is 
unrelated to defendant’s forum activities.72  Here exercise of personal jurisdiction 
would offend due process.73  The Court ruled that “the casual presence of the 
corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a 
state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of 
action unconnected with the activities there.”74  The Court further observed that due 
process “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in 
personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no 
contacts, ties, or relations.”75 
Area 2 - systematic and continuous activities in the forum state and the claim 
for relief arises out of those activities.76  The Court found that the propriety of 
exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign entity under these circumstances 
“has never been doubted.”77 
Area 3 - no systematic and continuous activities in the forum state but the 
claim for relief arises out of defendant’s contacts with the forum.78  In dicta, the 
Court noted that prior decisions had gone both ways on the question of whether 
committing a single act within a state giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim is 
constitutionally sufficient to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
foreign entity.79  The test for the exercise of jurisdiction “cannot be simply 
mechanical or quantitative,” but “must depend rather upon the quality and nature of 
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it 
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”80 
Area 4 - systematic and continuous activities within the state but the claim is 
unrelated to defendant’s forum activities.81  Again in dicta, the Court recognized 
                                                                                                     
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 319. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See id. at 317. 
 72.  See id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 319. 
 76.  See id. at 317. 
 77.  See id. 
 78.  Id. at 318-19. 
 79.  Id. at 318. 
 80.  Id. at 319. 
 81.  Id. at 318. 
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that there are cases where a foreign corporation’s local activity is “so substantial 
and of such nature to justify suit against it on causes of actions arising from 
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”82  By contrast, the Court also 
recognized that prior cases had held that “continuous activity of some sort[] within 
a state” was not enough to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction on a claim 
unrelated to forum activities.83  As was the case with Area 3, the Court left 
determination of Area 4 issues for another day. 
D. The Cases Post-International Shoe 
Not surprisingly, the cases decided after International Shoe have arisen in Area 
3 and Area 4, which the Court had acknowledged were unsettled territories. 
1. Area 3 - Specific Jurisdiction 
Area 3, often referred to as specific jurisdiction, has garnered most of the 
attention from the courts.  This is not surprising, given the globalization of 
commerce and the explosion of products liability litigation dating back to the mid-
twentieth century.  As legislatures enacted long-arm statutes to take advantage of 
the broader jurisdictional bases permitted by International Shoe,84 the courts sought 
to flesh out the meaning of, and the constitutional limitations imposed by, the 
minimum contacts test.  In Hanson v. Denckla,85 decided thirteen years after 
International Shoe, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the constitutional 
standards governing the exercise of jurisdiction had evolved since the days of 
Pennoyer but then stated that “it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the 
eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.”86  
The Court further stated that “[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some 
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of 
[minimum] contact with the forum State.”87  Rather, “it is essential in each case that 
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.”88 
Over a decade later, in World-Wide Volkswagen,89 (“WWV”) the Court 
recapitulated virtually verbatim its holding in Hanson.  In WWV, the Court held 
that the state of Oklahoma lacked personal jurisdiction over a New York wholesaler 
who distributed cars in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut and a New York 
auto dealer who had sold plaintiffs an allegedly defective car in a products liability 
action arising from an accident occurring in Oklahoma.90  In its decision, the Court 
stressed the absence of any meaningful affiliating circumstances between the 
                                                                                                     
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (MCKINNEY, Westlaw through L.2016, chapter 1). 
 85.  357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 86.  Id. at 251. 
 87.  Id. at 253. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 90.  Id. at 288-91. 
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defendants and the forum state.91  The Court rejected the argument that because the 
automobile could be driven almost anyplace, it was foreseeable that the car would 
wind up in Oklahoma and that such foreseeability was sufficient for Oklahoma to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the New York wholesaler and retailer.92   In so 
ruling, the Court did not hold that foreseeability was irrelevant to the jurisdictional 
analysis.  Rather, it held that the foreseeability that is relevant to the exercise of 
long-arm jurisdiction in the due process context is not the likelihood that the car in 
question could find its way to Oklahoma, but whether “the defendant’s conduct and 
connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there.”93  The Court emphasized that the burden on the defendant is 
a primary concern in measuring reasonableness but also set forth a list of factors 
that must be considered in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a 
foreign defendant comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice, including: “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief[;] . . . the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; 
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies.”94 
Still, the WWV Court sent a mixed message.  On the one hand, the Court made 
clear that International Shoe had not rendered state boundaries irrelevant for 
jurisdictional purposes and that, quoting language from Hanson reminiscent of 
Pennoyer, restrictions on a state’s power to exercise jurisdiction “are a consequence 
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.”95  On the other 
hand, the Court suggested that the Constitution still allows the states broad powers 
in adjudicating actions arising from conduct occurring outside their borders, stating 
that “[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if 
it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the 
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers 
in the forum State.”96  The “stream of commerce” reference suggests that, 
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notwithstanding the limiting language elsewhere in the opinion, long-arm statutes 
still have a very broad reach. 
Yet, perhaps because the Court concluded that jurisdiction was lacking, the 
extent of that reach was not explored in WWV.  For over three decades, the so-
called stream of commerce theory has been the focus of the debate on the limits of 
the exercise of specific jurisdiction.  How do courts square the notion that state 
boundaries place inherent limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction with the view 
that a defendant who places its goods in the stream of commerce should be 
answerable to lawsuits brought in states where a product is purchased by 
consumers? 
That question has divided the Supreme Court.  In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court,97 a plurality of four urged that due process requires more than that 
a defendant simply deliver its products into the stream of commerce with the 
understanding that they will be used there; it must “purposefully direct” its 
activities at the forum state.98  Under this view, a seller who engaged in interstate 
commerce but consciously chose not to market its products in a given state would 
not be amenable to suit there, even if its products wound up in the forum state and 
caused injury to the plaintiff in the forum.99  The other five members of the Court 
in Asahi, in two separate opinions, seemed to be of the view that WWV’s stream of 
commerce theory did not limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction to those cases in 
which defendant’s conduct is purposefully directed at the forum state.100 
All of the Justices agreed, however, that it would offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice for California to exercise in personam jurisdiction 
over Asahi on the record before it.101  Accordingly, the discussion concerning the 
continuing viability of the WWV’s stream of commerce theory can be best 
described as dicta.  However, the battle lines had been drawn in Asahi, and it was 
only a matter of time before the Court revisited the issue. 
That happened in 2011 in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.102  In that 
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court had upheld the state’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over an English machine manufacturer that had sold a machine to a New Jersey 
manufacturer at a trade show in Las Vegas.103  The new owner shipped the machine 
to its New Jersey factory.104   Nicastro, an employee, suffered a severe injury while 
operating the machine and later brought a product liability claim against the 
                                                                                                     
 97.  480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 98.  Id. at 111-12. 
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 102.  131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 103.  Id. at 2785. 
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English manufacturer in New Jersey state court.105 
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court 
and held that the English defendant lacked sufficient minimum contacts with New 
Jersey.106  Four of the six Justices would have struck down the stream of commerce 
theory and concluded that the plaintiff must show that the defendant had targeted 
the state or purposefully directed its activities at the state before the defendant 
could be said to have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum state.107 
The concurring Justices, Breyer and Alito, agreed that minimum contacts with 
New Jersey were lacking in the case, but felt that the targeting standard proposed 
by the four Justice plurality was too demanding.108  They agreed with the majority 
that something more than putting goods into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that consumers would buy and use those goods in the forum state had 
to be demonstrated.109  Precisely what additional acts beyond putting goods into the 
stream of commerce—but short of targeting—would serve to satisfy the minimum 
contacts standard remains unclear.  For example, would some advertising or 
promotional activity by the defendant within the forum state, in addition to the 
actual sale of goods, suffice?  Clearly, the constitutional standards for measuring 
minimum contacts have been recalibrated, and putting goods into the stream of 
commerce with the expectation that they will be used in the forum state is no 
longer enough to satisfy Due Process. 
2. Area 4 - General Jurisdiction 
In marked contrast to Area 3 jurisdiction, Area 4 jurisdiction, often referred to 
as general jurisdiction, has gotten relatively little attention—until very recently.  In 
International Shoe, the Supreme Court declined to address the constitutionality of 
Area 4 jurisdiction, but did recognize that some courts had upheld the exercise of in 
personam jurisdiction over foreign entities having a substantial presence in the 
forum on claims unrelated to any activities within the forum state.110 
The Supreme Court first explicitly addressed the issue of Area 4 jurisdiction 
directly in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.111  Defendant Benguet 
operated mines in the Philippines, which, prior to World War II, was a territory of 
the United States.112  Following the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in 
December of 1941, Benguet suspended mining operations there; management 
relocated to Ohio, where its president conducted the business activities of the 
company.113  Plaintiff was a shareholder who sued the company in Ohio state court 
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for failure to pay dividends or issue stock.114  Plaintiff’s claim did not arise out of 
any activities by the defendant in the forum state.115 
The Supreme Court upheld the exercise of general jurisdiction, concluding that 
although mining activities had been suspended during the Japanese occupation, 
many of Benguet’s wartime activities “were directed from Ohio and were being 
given the personal attention of the president in that State[.]”116  Benguet maintained 
an office in Ohio where company files were kept and two secretaries were 
employed.117  Directors’ meetings were held in Ohio.118  Company business 
decisions were made in Ohio, and the rehabilitation of property in the Philippines, 
once the war ended, was directed from Ohio.119  The company maintained 
substantial bank accounts in Ohio and retained an Ohio bank to serve as transfer 
agent for stock in the company.120  In short, Benguet’s president “carried on in Ohio 
a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime 
activities of the company.”121  As the Court later explained, general jurisdiction 
existed in Perkins because “Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if temporary, 
place of business.”122 
However, the factual circumstances giving rise to this suit in Ohio—
specifically, the intervention of World War II and the Japanese invasion of the 
Philippines that effectively rendered the Philippines civil justice system 
inaccessible—left some doubt as to whether Perkins was a carte blanch 
endorsement of general jurisdiction or simply sui generis.  Over three decades later, 
in its Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall123 decision, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the Perkins holding is not limited to the peculiar facts in that case.124  
In Helicopteros, the plaintiffs were the survivors and representatives of 
construction workers employed by a Texas entity who had been killed in a 
helicopter crash in Peru while being ferried from a worksite.125  Plaintiffs brought a 
wrongful death action in Texas state court, and the Texas courts ultimately upheld 
the exercise of jurisdiction over the Colombia-based defendant.126  The Supreme 
Court concluded that “the kind of systematic and continuous general business 
contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins” did not exist in Helicopteros.127 
The Court pointed out two key distinctions between Perkins and Helicopteros.  
First, in Perkins, defendant was conducting all of its business activities out of Ohio; 
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 122.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011). 
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its contacts with Ohio were systematic and continuous.128  In Helicopteros, on the 
other hand, defendant’s contacts with the forum state were isolated and sporadic, 
consisting of trips to Texas to negotiate a contract and to buy helicopters, spare 
parts and training services.129  Second, whereas defendant in Perkins was a seller of 
commodities, defendant in Helicopteros entered Texas to purchase goods and 
services.130  The Court concluded that visits to a state to purchase, “even if 
occurring at regular intervals,” would not warrant the inference that the corporation 
was present within the jurisdiction.131 
Although the Court ultimately held that the plaintiff failed to make the case for 
general jurisdiction, the upshot of Helicopteros seemed to be that Perkins was not 
sui generis.132  The exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations 
engaged in substantial and continuous activity would be constitutional even with 
respect to claims that are unrelated to defendant’s activities within the forum state.  
Still, the Court remained hazy on precisely what constituted substantial and 
continuous activity sufficient to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction.  On the 
one hand, the opinion suggests that plaintiff need not show that the forum was the 
defendant’s principal place of business.133  On the other hand, the Court did not 
budge from its earlier ruling in International Shoe that “continuous activity of some 
sorts within a state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be 
amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.”134 
III. GENERAL JURISDICTION REVISITED AND RESTATED 
A. Confusion in the Law 
Throughout the twentieth century, the law with respect to the exercise of 
general jurisdiction over corporations remained confused.135  Part of the confusion 
stemmed from the fundamental differences between individuals and corporations.  
Historically, the bases for exercising in personam jurisdiction have been the same 
with respect to individuals and corporations, with one important exception: 
presence, the archetypical grounds for exercising jurisdiction over an individual, is 
not a basis on which to proceed against corporations.136  Whereas an individual can 
be in only one place at any given time, a corporation—an artificial entity that can 
act only through individuals—is theoretically “present” in any and every location 
in which the corporation conducts business activities.137  Courts have long 
recognized the unfairness inherent in forcing a corporation to defend an action 
wherever it conducts operations, particularly where the alleged activities 
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underlying the plaintiff’s claim are unrelated to corporate activities in the forum 
state.138  Courts have long recognized that a corporation could be subject to general 
jurisdiction in its state of incorporation, that is, its domicile.139  Accordingly, a New 
York corporation could be sued in New York on a claim arising in Texas, but a 
Florida corporation could not be sued in New York on the same claim. 
As the territorial approach to jurisdiction espoused in Pennoyer began to wane, 
states looked for ways to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction.  As 
discussed below,140 one avenue was consent.  States would require foreign 
corporations to appoint agents for service of process as a quid pro quo for 
authorization to do business within the state and assert jurisdiction on a consent or 
implied consent theory.141 
Although that approach may be effective against foreign corporations that 
actually registered to do business,142 it would not capture those companies that did 
not register.  To fill this gap, state courts began to assert general jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations having continuous and substantial presence within the state on 
the theory that such a company is “present” within the state.143  Hence, the so-
called corporate presence doctrine emerged.  The New York Court of Appeals 
decision in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.144 illustrates that corporate presence 
doctrine. 
Tauza involved a claim by a New York domiciliary against a Pennsylvania 
corporation, headquartered in Philadelphia with offices in New York City, on a 
claim totally unrelated to defendant’s New York activities.145  Defendant’s New 
York office was run by a sales agent who supervised eight salesmen as well as 
clerical staff.146  The salesmen met daily to receive instructions from their superiors 
and to systematically and regularly solicit orders for coal, which were then 
transmitted to corporate headquarters in Pennsylvania for approval and which 
resulted in continuous shipments of coal from Pennsylvania to New York.147  On 
these facts, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]o do these things is to do business 
within this state in such a sense and in such a degree as to subject the corporation 
doing them to the jurisdiction of our courts.”148  The general jurisdiction principles 
embodied in Tauza were subsequently codified in New York’s procedural code.149 
Although the question of sufficiency of in-state activity necessary to establish 
                                                                                                     
 138.  See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319; see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1066 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated December 2015). 
 139.  Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 760. 
 140.  See infra notes 200-237 and accompanying text. 
 141.  See D. Craig Lewis, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations Based On Registration and 
Appointment of an Agent: An Unconstitutional Condition Perpetuated, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1990) 
(A majority of courts “have applied various forms of consent theory to hold that by [appointment of an 
agent] a foreign corporation automatically submits itself to unlimited assertion of a state’s 
jurisdiction.”). 
 142.  See SIEGEL, supra, note 4, § 82, at 143. 
 143.  Id. at 140. 
 144.  115 N.E. 915 (1917). 
 145.  Id. at 265, 268. 
 146.  Id. at 265. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 266. 
 149.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 301 (MCKINNEY, Westlaw through L.2016 chapter 1). 
2016] GENERAL JURISDICTION 2.0 303 
that a foreign corporation is in New York “with a fair measure of permanence and 
continuity”150 has not been free from doubt, the New York courts have generally 
focused on the following factors: (1) the existence of an office in New York; (2) the 
solicitation of business in New York; (3) the presence of bank accounts or other 
personal property within the state; and (4) the presence of employees or agents in 
the state.151 
The Supreme Court in International Shoe cited Tauza as an example of an 
instance “in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought 
so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action 
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities” but did not rule at that 
point on the constitutionality of general jurisdiction.152  Tauza was subsequently 
cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Perkins, wherein it upheld the 
constitutionality of general jurisdiction.153 
Nevertheless, the parameters of the exercise of jurisdiction under the corporate 
presence doctrine remained fuzzy.  Judge Learned Hand expressed that uncertainty: 
Possibly the maintenance of a regular agency for the solicitation of business will 
serve without more . . . .  In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., . . . there was no 
more, but the business was continuous and substantial.  Purchases, though carried 
on regularly, are not enough . . . nor are the activities of subsidiary corporations 
. . . or of connecting carriers . . . .  The maintenance of an office, though always a 
make-weight, and enough, when accompanied by continuous negotiation, to settle 
claims . . . is not of much significance . . . .  It is quite impossible to establish any 
rule from the decided cases; we must step from tuft to tuft across the morass.154 
More recently, the federal courts have seen an influx of foreign-based claims 
against foreign defendants by plaintiffs from outside of the United States, many of 
which involve general jurisdiction.155  In addition to the due process concerns that 
mirror those in domestic general jurisdiction cases, these cases raise more 
fundamental concerns of comity and international cooperation.156 
In two recent decisions, the Supreme Court has addressed the issues left open 
in Helicopteros and clarified the constitutional standards for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction. 
1. Goodyear 
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,157 plaintiffs, whose sons 
died in a bus accident outside Paris, France, brought a wrongful death action in 
North Carolina state court against an American tire manufacturer and three foreign 
subsidiaries, alleging that the accident had been caused by defective tire 
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manufacture.158  Plaintiffs sought to assert general jurisdiction in North Carolina 
over the three foreign subsidiaries.159  The Court found that the foreign subsidiaries 
carried on no business activities in North Carolina.160  Nor were the tires involved 
in the accident ever distributed in North Carolina by the foreign subsidiaries, 
although a small percentage of tires manufactured by the foreign subsidiaries did 
find their way into North Carolina through other Goodyear USA affiliates.161  The 
North Carolina courts upheld the exercise of general jurisdiction noting that the 
tires manufactured by the foreign subsidiaries reach North Carolina through the 
stream of commerce as a consequence of a “highly-organized distribution process” 
involving Goodyear USA subsidiaries and defendants made “no attempt to keep 
these tires from reaching the North Carolina market.”162 
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the “sprawling view” of general 
jurisdiction enunciated by the North Carolina court that “any substantial 
manufacturer or seller of goods would be amenable to suit, on any claim for relief, 
wherever its products are distributed.”163  Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg 
reiterated the language of International Shoe that “continuous activity of some 
sort[]” within a state is not enough to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction.164  
Rather, general jurisdiction may be exercised in “instances in which the continuous 
corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to 
justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from 
those activities.”165  The key to the exercise of general jurisdiction for Justice 
Ginsburg was whether the corporation’s activities were such that it was “at home” 
in the forum state.166  Justice Ginsburg suggested that a corporation may be fairly 
regarded as “at home” in the state of incorporation or principal place of business,167 
noting that jurisdiction in Perkins had been upheld because “Ohio was the 
corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business.”168  The Court, however, 
did not rule that state of incorporation and principal place of business are the 
exclusive bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction and left open the question of 
whether a corporation may be viewed as “at home” in another state where it had 
substantial business activities.169 
2. Daimler 
Three years later, in Daimler AG v. Bauman,170 the Court revisited the question 
of when a foreign defendant’s forum activities are sufficient to justify the exercise 
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of personal jurisdiction with respect to claims unrelated to the defendant’s forum 
activities. 
The facts in Daimler were unusual.  Plaintiffs, twenty-two residents of 
Argentina, sued Daimler, a German corporation, in a California federal court, under 
the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, alleging that 
MB Argentina, Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary, had collaborated with 
Argentinian state security forces “to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill plaintiffs and 
their relatives during the military dictatorship in place there from 1976 through 
1983[.]”171  The alleged illegal acts occurred in Argentina; none of the acts 
complained of took place in California or any place else within the United States.172  
Nor did the plaintiffs charge that any American company acted unlawfully.173  
Plaintiffs claimed that Daimler, the only named defendant, was vicariously liable 
for the conduct of its Argentinian subsidiary.174 
California jurisdiction over Daimler was predicated on the California acts of 
MBUSA, Daimler’s North American subsidiary, a Delaware limited liability 
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey.175  MBUSA served 
as Daimler’s exclusive distributor in the United States purchasing cars 
manufactured in Germany by Daimler, importing them and distributing them to 
independent dealerships located throughout the United States.176  MBUSA had 
multiple California-based facilities, including an office in Costa Mesa, a vehicle 
preparation center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine.  MBUSA’s California 
sales accounted for 2.4% of Daimler’s sales worldwide.177 
The trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.178  The Ninth Circuit 
initially agreed, but upon rehearing, reversed and upheld jurisdiction over Daimler 
on an agency theory.179  In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit relied on prior Circuit 
precedent focusing on “whether the subsidiary ‘performs services that are 
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a 
representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would undertake to 
perform substantially similar services.’”180  The Ninth Circuit concluded that they 
were.181  The Supreme Court, without passing judgment directly on the viability of 
the agency theory, rejected the Ninth Circuit approach because it would “stack the 
deck” in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction and would uphold jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations whenever they have an in-state subsidiary performing services 
for the parent.182  That is so because presumably anything that the corporation does 
through a subsidiary is something that it would do itself were the subsidiary 
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unavailable.183  Such a result would go beyond “even the ‘sprawling view of 
general jurisdiction’. . . rejected in Goodyear.”184 
The Court then recapitulated its Goodyear holding chapter and verse, stressing 
that “the inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum 
contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether 
that corporation’s affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to 
render [it] at home in the forum State.”185  The Court reiterated that the “paradig[m] 
. . . bases” for exercising general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation are the 
state of incorporation and the state of principal place of business, since both these 
affiliations are unique, easily ascertainable, and allow for development of simple, 
predictable jurisdictional rules.186  The Court also stated explicitly what had been 
implicit in Goodyear: although the place of incorporation and principal place of 
business are paradigm bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction, they are not the 
exclusive bases; a foreign corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction in a 
state other than the state of incorporation or the state of its principal place of 
business.187 
Still, the Court shed little light on the nature and quality of activities within a 
state to establish that a foreign corporation is “at home” there.  Plaintiffs in 
Daimler had argued that the foreign corporation would be subject to general 
jurisdiction in every state in which it had a substantial, continuous, and systematic 
course of business, a view the Court dismissed, observing that “[i]f Daimler’s 
California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in 
California, the same global reach would presumably be available in every other 
state in which MBUSA’s sales are sizable.”188  The Court reasoned that “[s]uch 
exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction” make it difficult for foreign 
corporations to structure their conduct of business in a manner that would enable 
them to predict with some certainty where they will or will not be amenable to suit 
as required by due process.189 
Moreover, the Court reasoned that the international context in which the claims 
arose militated against the exercise of general jurisdiction.190  The Court was 
troubled by the fact that claims asserted under United States law by twenty-two 
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Argentinian residents against a German corporation for conduct occurring in 
Argentina had been entertained by a California federal court in the first place.191  In 
the Court’s view, to allow these cases to proceed would pose a serious risk to 
international comity.192  The expansive view of general jurisdiction adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit is at odds with the more limited view of jurisdiction based on 
domicile that many trading partners of the United States hold.193  The Court noted 
that in the past, the broad view of personal jurisdiction asserted by some United 
States courts has hampered international negotiations on reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.194  The Court further noted that attempts to sue foreign 
entities based on the acts of their domestic subsidiaries under principles of general 
jurisdiction could discourage foreign investment and generate international 
friction.195  Accordingly, exercise of jurisdiction on the facts before the court would 
offend traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice.”196 
IV. IMPACT OF DAIMLER 
A. Death of the Corporate Presence Doctrine 
Daimler strikes the death knell to the corporate presence doctrine.  The 
Daimler court marginalized Tauza, noting that it was “decided in an era dominated 
by Pennoyer’s territorial thinking” and “should not attract heavy reliance today.”197  
In short, Tauza, to the extent that it ever reflected a majority view, is no longer 
good law.198  After Daimler, the doctrine of general jurisdiction has little 
independent significance.  Corporations could always be sued on any claim in their 
state of incorporation or the functional equivalent, the principal place of business.  
There will be the occasional Perkins-like case that the courts may deem 
exceptional; however, by and large, general jurisdiction after Daimler has gone the 
way of quasi in rem jurisdiction after Shaffer.  That is, it exists more in theory than 
in reality, and that is not necessarily bad.  There may be cases where Daimler 
inconveniences plaintiffs, but Daimler does not prevent plaintiffs from invoking 
personal jurisdiction based on acts within the forum state or consent. 
Daimler, of course, applies only to corporations.  Nevertheless, it raises an 
interesting question.  If general jurisdiction over a corporation can be exercised 
only where the corporation is “at home,” should not the same be true regarding 
individuals?  The next logical step is for the Court to revisit its ruling in Burnham 
that fortuitous presence within a state is a sufficient basis upon which to exercise in 
personam jurisdiction. 
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B. General Jurisdiction Based On Corporate Registration Statutes 
Goodyear and Daimler call into question the extent to which state courts can 
exercise general jurisdiction over foreign corporations based on state registration 
statutes.  For a variety of reasons, states require foreign corporations to register 
with state authorities to conduct business activities within that state.199  All states 
require that, as part of the registration process, the foreign corporation designate an 
agent, who may be a state official, for service of process within the state.200  Failure 
to register typically means that the state’s courthouse doors will be closed to the 
delinquent company;201 therefore, corporations have a strong incentive to comply 
with the registration process in order to assure that they can enforce contracts and 
other obligations entered into in a given state.202  The courts have historically 
disagreed about whether the foreign corporation would subject itself to general 
jurisdiction by the act of registration.203 
1. Implied Consent 
The early cases upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign corporation 
that had registered to do business in a state on the theory that by appointing an 
agent for service of process, it impliedly consented to the exercise of general 
jurisdiction and thus could be sued in a state where it had registered on claims 
unrelated to its in-state activities.  In the leading case of Pennsylvania Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.,204 the Supreme Court, per 
Justice Holmes, upheld jurisdiction in an action where an Arizona plaintiff sued a 
Pennsylvania corporation in Missouri state court based on an insurance claim 
arising in Colorado.205  In that 1917 opinion, Justice Holmes reasoned that by 
registering to do business in Missouri, the defendant foreign corporation had 
consented to service of process in Missouri.206  The Court rejected defendant’s 
argument that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Missouri court on a matter that did 
not involve a Missouri contract was a denial of due process.207 It ruled that the 
defendant, by complying with the statute and designating an agent for service of 
process, ran the “risk of the interpretation that might be put upon [the statute] by 
the [Missouri] courts,”208 thus “hardly leav[ing] a constitutional question open.”209  
The decision made no mention of the defendant’s in-state activities. 
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Pennsylvania Fire Insurance has not been directly overruled by the Supreme 
Court, but its rationale has been severely undermined by subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions.210  The Pennsylvania Fire Insurance decision was cut from the 
Pennoyer mold, which limited the exercise of personal jurisdiction to situations 
where the defendant was present within the state when served or consented to 
jurisdiction.  That approach is clearly out of step with the Court’s later 
jurisdictional pronouncements in International Shoe and its progeny, which shift 
the focus of jurisdictional analysis away from concepts of physical power and 
territoriality and toward a more flexible standard focusing on the “quality and 
nature” of the defendant’s forum activities, the relationship between those forum 
activities and the plaintiff’s claim for relief, and fundamental principles of 
fairness.211 
Not surprisingly, the lower courts have not been in agreement on the 
continuing vitality of Pennsylvania Fire Insurance post-International Shoe.  Some 
courts212 continue to view that case as authoritative and uphold that compliance 
with the registration process constitutes implied consent to general jurisdiction.  
Other courts,213 focusing on post-International Shoe developments have held that 
compliance with the registration process does not by itself establish consent to the 
exercise of general jurisdiction.214  Under this view, service of process on the 
designated agent may establish the requisite notice of suit but does not provide a 
basis for jurisdiction.215   
The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the continuing vitality of 
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance in the wake of International Shoe.  However, in 
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Shaffer v. Heitner,216 the Court did rule in the context of a due process challenge to 
the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction, that “all assertions of state court 
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International 
Shoe and its progeny.”217  The Court in Shaffer also stressed that the focus of 
jurisdictional analysis subsequent to International Shoe had shifted away from the 
narrow formalistic concepts of in-state service and consent advocated by Pennoyer 
to an examination of “the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the 
litigation.”218  A foreign corporation may well be registered in a state but have no 
meaningful business activities within that state.  The foreign corporation’s only 
nexus with the forum would be its registration, and there would be no connection 
among the defendant and forum, on the one hand, and the litigation on the other 
hand.   The exercise of jurisdiction in that circumstance would seemingly run 
contrary to the standards enunciated in International Shoe and reiterated in Shaffer 
that only after evaluating the defendant-foreign corporation’s contacts with the 
forum can jurisdiction be determined.219 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Goodyear and Daimler reinforce this 
view.  Again, neither case specifically addresses the issue of whether appointment 
of an agent for service of process, as part of the registration process implies consent 
to the exercise of general jurisdiction.  In fact, both cases involved defendants that 
had been incorporated outside of the United States, who had neither registered with 
any state authority nor sought authorization to do business in any state.  
 Nevertheless, the reasoning of these cases, particularly the Court’s mandate 
that any jurisdictional analysis must be based on the nature and quality of a 
company’s contacts with the forum, strongly suggests that general jurisdiction 
would not be upheld on the basis of implied consent through mere compliance with 
state corporate registration statutes.  The lower courts, however, have not been 
uniform in their assessment of the impact of Daimler and Goodyear on assertions 
of general jurisdiction over foreign companies based on compliance with state 
registration statutes. 
An interesting split of authority has emerged in the District of Delaware with 
respect to the exercise of general jurisdiction over the very same company, Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals.220  In AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court 
held that under Daimler, a foreign corporation’s mere compliance with corporate 
registration statutes does not give rise to general jurisdiction over that foreign 
corporation.221  First, the court concluded “[b]oth consent and minimum contacts 
. . . are rooted in due process [and that] [j]ust as minimum contacts must be present 
so as not to offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’ the 
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defendants alleged ‘consent’ to jurisdiction must do the same.”222  In finding that a 
simple showing of “continuous and systematic contacts” could not establish general 
jurisdiction, Daimler “rejected the idea that a company could be haled into court 
merely for ‘doing business’ in a state.”223  Under that theory, out of state 
corporations could not “structure their primary conduct with some minimum 
assurance as to where that conduct will or will not render them liable to suit.”224  
Second, were compliance a basis of jurisdiction, companies with a nationwide 
presence would be subject to suit all over the country, an outcome that Daimler 
specifically sought to avoid.225  Third, the Court reasoned that a contrary holding 
would create “perverse incentives”: companies that complied could be sued in that 
state, but companies that disobeyed the law would be immune from suit.226  Fourth, 
the court found that Delaware’s registration statutes merely outline procedures for 
doing business in Delaware and do not address jurisdictional issues.227  On the 
other hand, the court in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.228 upheld jurisdiction based compliance with the Delaware registration 
statutes.229  The Acorda court reasoned that the Daimler holding was directed at the 
issue of the foreign defendant’s minimum contacts, not at the issue of consent.230  
The Acorda court further reasoned that Daimler, by its reference to Perkins, 
recognized consent as an independent basis for in personam jurisdiction.231   
In so ruling, the Acorda court took issue with the earlier decision in 
AstraZeneca.232  The Acorda court distinguished between “doing business” in a 
state and compliance with registration statutes.233  It urged that a company that is 
registered in a state, as opposed to merely doing business, has notice of potential 
amenability to suits and can structure its conduct so as to avoid law suits in a given 
state.234  The Acorda court did acknowledge the conceptual strain in accepting the 
Daimler holding that a foreign corporation cannot be subject to general jurisdiction 
for merely “doing business” in that state, on the one hand, but that the very same 
corporation can be subject to general jurisdiction in any state where the corporation 
complies with the registration statutes, irrespective of its contacts, on the other 
hand.235 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Delaware District Court had 
specific jurisdiction over the defendant and sidestepped the general jurisdiction 
issue.236 
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2. Express Consent 
Several states, as part of the registration process, require express consent to 
jurisdiction, irrespective of where the claim arises.237  The question of whether this 
express consent cures the jurisdictional defects that arise with respect to implied 
consent has not been addressed by the courts.  A pro-jurisdiction argument might be 
crafted by analogy to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burnham v. Superior 
Court.238  The issue in Burnham was whether the fortuitous presence of a defendant 
within a given state was sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction over that 
defendant.239  In Burnham, the defendant was a New Jersey domiciliary whose 
former wife and child lived in California.240  The defendant travelled to California 
to visit his child and also to conduct other business.241  While in California, he was 
served with process in an action commenced by his former wife in California state 
court.242  The defendant argued that under Shaffer, jurisdiction was void.243  Shaffer 
had held that the fortuitous presence of property within a state was by itself an 
insufficient basis for that state to proceed quasi in rem against the defendant.244   
Given the Shaffer holding, defendant argued, fortuitous presence of an individual 
within a state could not confer in personam jurisdiction.245 
The Supreme Court in Burnham disagreed with the defendant and held that 
California’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him based on personal service of 
process while present with the state did not violate due process.246  The Court, 
however, could not piece together a majority opinion supporting its ruling.  Writing 
for the plurality, Justice Scalia reasoned that presence is a jurisdictional principle 
that “is both firmly approved by tradition and still favored” and that “its validation 
is its pedigree, as the phrase ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ 
makes clear.”247  Justice Scalia also distinguished International Shoe, noting that 
that case involved an action against a foreign corporation, served outside of the 
state, and not service of process on an individual present within the state.248  
Writing separately, Justice Brennan maintained that jurisdiction based on fortuitous 
presence in California be upheld because defendant had minimum contacts with the 
state by virtue of the fact that his physical presence within the state entitled him to 
all protections of California law.249 
From Burnham, one can argue that consent, like presence, is a traditionally 
recognized basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction and shares the same 
pedigree.  However, the analogy of consent to presence is flawed.  First, it is a 
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Pennoyer-esque argument that honors form over substance, and is at odds with the 
mandate of International Shoe to analyze the exercise of jurisdiction in accordance 
with the nature and quality of the defendant’s contacts with the forum.250  Second, 
statutorily coerced consent requiring foreign corporations to defend any and all 
claims in that state, irrespective of where the claims arise, is unreasonable and 
contrary to the rule of International Shoe that assertion of jurisdiction over foreign 
entities must comport with fair play and substantial justice.251  Accordingly, it 
violates due process to force a foreign corporation, not “at home” in the forum, to 
defend a claim arising elsewhere.  This is not to suggest that all statutes that coerce 
personal jurisdiction are unconstitutional.  Law, by its very nature, is coercive.  
Only when a state statute is unreasonably coercive would enforced consent offend a 
foreign corporation’s due process rights. 
Third, coerced general jurisdiction is unnecessary.  Even under Goodyear and 
Daimler, domestic corporations would still be subject to jurisdiction somewhere in 
the United States—either in the state of incorporation or the state of its principal 
place of business, irrespective of any consent.  In both Goodyear and Daimler, 
defendants were incorporated abroad, operating abroad and not seeking to do 
business in the United States.  Given this fact, it is difficult to see how a forum’s 
subjecting defendants in either case to personal jurisdiction with respect to claims 
arising overseas serves any legitimate interest of that forum, beyond perhaps seeing 
justice done.  Nor does exercise of such jurisdiction serve the interests of the 
interstate civil justice system.  It is one thing to subject a foreign corporation to 
jurisdiction based on claims arising in the forum state, it is quite another to force 
that corporation to defend claims unrelated to any forum activities simply to see 
that justice is done.  Goodyear and Daimler do make it more difficult to sue 
corporations formed and operating outside of the United States in American courts 
on a general jurisdiction theory.  That is not necessarily bad. 
C. Concerns for International Comity 
The fact that the defendant was an overseas corporation doing business on an 
international scale played no small part in Daimler’s decision denying general 
jurisdiction.  The Court pointedly criticized the Ninth Circuit because “[it] paid 
little heed to the risks to international comity its expansive view of general 
jurisdiction posed.”252  The Court noted that “[o]ther nations do not share the 
uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in 
this case,” pointing out that in Europe, jurisdiction over corporations is largely 
limited to the country of a corporation’s domicile.253 
The Court also cited instances where the expansive view of general jurisdiction 
expressed by United States domestic courts had in the past “impeded negotiations 
of international agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
judgments” and led to international friction.254  The Court, in addition, noted 
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concerns that exercising general jurisdiction over foreign companies based on the 
activities of American-based subsidiaries could discourage foreign investors.255  
Accordingly, it concluded that “subjecting Daimler to general jurisdiction of courts 
in California would not accord with the ‘fair play and substantial justice’ due 
process demands.”256 
The Daimler decision is consistent with other recent Supreme Court rulings 
shutting the doors of American courts to foreign plaintiffs suing on claims arising 
abroad against foreign defendants.  For example, in F. Hoffman LaRoche Ltd. v. 
Empagran, S.A.,257 the Court held that principles of prescriptive comity militated 
against an expansive reading of the American antitrust laws that would allow 
United States courts to hear private treble damage actions brought by foreign 
plaintiffs against foreign defendants on claims arising outside of the United 
States.258  Similarly, in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,259 the Court ruled 
that the American securities laws do not provide a claim for relief by foreign 
plaintiffs against foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection 
with securities traded on foreign exchanges.260  Most recently, in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum,261 an action under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) brought in the 
Southern District of New York by Nigerian Nationals against British, Dutch and 
Nigerian corporations alleging that defendants aided and abetted torture by the 
Nigerian government, the Court ruled that that ATS did not apply to violations of 
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States.262 
The plaintiffs’ principal motivation in choosing United States venues in these 
cases was apparently to get the benefit of more favorable American law.  The 
upshot of the decisions in Empagran, Morrison, and Kiobel was to (1) prevent 
blatant forum shopping in the United States by foreign plaintiffs; (2) demonstrate 
mutual respect for the legal systems of other sovereign nations; and (3) minimize 
the influx of foreign cases into the United States, thereby preventing the American 
court system from becoming a magnet for international disputes that should be 
litigated elsewhere. 
V. QUESTIONS AFTER DAIMLER 
A. Attributing Contacts of Subsidiaries to the Parent Corporation 
The Court in Daimler did not systematically address the question of whether, 
or the extent to which, general jurisdiction may be exercised over a parent 
corporation on the basis of the forum contacts of a subsidiary.  It is black letter law 
that the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not enough to create 
personal jurisdiction over the parent on the basis of the subsidiary’s contacts with 
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the forum.263  Accordingly, the courts will generally respect the separate identities 
of a parent and its subsidiaries; and a parent “may be directly involved in the 
activities of its subsidiaries without incurring liability so long as that involvement 
is consistent with the parent’s investor status.”264  A parent may (1) monitor the 
subsidiary’s performance; (2) supervise the subsidiary’s finances; and (3) articulate 
policies and procedures for the subsidiary.265 
On the other hand, courts may disregard the separateness between parent and 
subsidiary, and impute the forum contacts of the subsidiary to the parent for 
jurisdictional purposes—where the subsidiary is an agent of the parent266 or where 
the subsidiary is the mere alter ego of the parent.267 
1. Alter Ego 
A subsidiary is the alter ego of its parent where the parent controls the 
subsidiary “to such a degree as to render the latter the mere instrumentality of the 
former.”268  A parent treats its subsidiary as a mere instrumentality where the parent 
disregards corporate formalities and exercises control over day-to-day operations of 
the subsidiary.269  The amount of control exercised must exceed the usual 
supervision that a parent exercises over a subsidiary.270  In assessing whether the 
degree of control exercised by the parent is sufficient to render the subsidiary an 
alter ego, the courts take into account a variety of factors.271 
The Court in Daimler did not reach the question of whether MBUSA was the 
alter ego of Daimler because the Ninth Circuit in upholding general jurisdiction 
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over Daimler did not rely on this theory.272  Nevertheless, the Court will 
undoubtedly be faced with the alter ego issue in the near future.  How the Court 
would resolve the alter ego issue in light of its Daimler holding is an interesting 
question.  Assume that a foreign parent treats its wholly owned American 
subsidiary as a mere instrumentality so that the alter ego doctrine is clearly in play.  
Assume further that the American subsidiary is a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Delaware and thus at home in that state.  The Court 
would likely find that foreign parent subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware 
under the alter ego theory.273 
Alternatively, suppose the foreign parent has multiple subsidiaries in the 
United States, incorporated in different states and having principal places of 
business in a variety of states, each of which is treated as a mere instrumentality by 
the parent.  On those facts, would the Court find the kind of “exorbitant exercises 
of all-purpose jurisdiction”274 that it condemned in Daimler?  Or, would the Court 
put the onus on the parent to restructure its American operations so as to make 
amenability to suit more certain and predictable? 
2. Agency 
Nor did the Daimler Court directly address the agency issues.  The Ninth 
Circuit had upheld jurisdiction over Daimler based on the California activities of 
MBUSA, ruling that MBUSA “performs services that are sufficiently important to 
[Daimler] that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s 
own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services.”275  The 
Supreme Court, however, declined to “pass judgment on the invocation of an 
agency theory in the context of general jurisdiction, for in no event [could] the 
appeals court’s analysis be sustained.”276  The Court found that “the inquiry into 
importance stacks the deck for it will always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer.”277  Of 
course, when something is important to a company, it will undertake the task itself 
if it cannot get someone else to perform that task.  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s 
agency theory would create general jurisdiction over a principal whenever the 
principal has an in-state subsidiary or agent, “an outcome that would sweep beyond 
even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we rejected in Goodyear.”278  
Thus, even if MBUSA is at home in California and its California contacts are 
imputable to Daimler, general jurisdiction over Daimler is lacking because 
Daimler’s “slim contacts with the State hardly render it at home there.”279  
Although the Court chose not to confront the agency issue directly, the opinion 
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leaves little room for the successful invocation of that theory where general 
jurisdiction is involved. 
B. The Role of Fair Play in the General Jurisdiction Analysis 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether the 
fairness prong of the International Shoe analysis applies with the same force in 
general jurisdiction cases as in specific jurisdiction cases.280  Still, there is little 
reason to doubt that fairness is a critical element of both specific and general 
jurisdiction.  The lower courts have uniformly so held.281  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has heard only a handful of general jurisdiction cases. 
In her Daimler concurrence, Justice Sotomayor called the majority to task for 
failure to focus on the fairness issue and failure to dispose of the matter on fairness 
grounds, as the Court had done is Asahi in the context of specific jurisdiction.282  
Justice Sotomayor seemed particularly troubled by the fact that the majority 
decision turned on the sufficiency of Daimler’s California contacts, an issue that 
she maintained had not been briefed or argued to the Court.283 She also criticized 
the majority for adopting the “at home” standard, which she viewed as (1) at odds 
with the “‘continuous and systematic’ contacts inquiry that has been taught to 
generations of first-year students” and (2) “a new rule of constitutional law that is 
unmoored from decades of precedent.”284 
Justice Sotomayor’s criticism of the majority may have been overly harsh.  
First, the issue on which the Court granted certiorari fairly encompasses the 
question of whether Daimler was “at home” in California.285  Moreover, the 
question of sufficiency of Daimler’s contacts was briefed both in the Circuit Court 
and the Supreme Court.286  Second, Asahi does not hold that a court must address 
the fairness issue at the outset.  Asahi turned on fairness because all the Justices 
agreed that the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by a California court in a third-
party action involving a Taiwanese company suing a Japanese entity on 
transactions occurring outside of the United States would be unreasonable.287  The 
Court in Asahi could not forge a majority on the issue of whether the defendant had 
the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state.288  By contrast, in Daimler, 
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the majority did agree that the requisite minimum contacts were absent.289  
Accordingly, there was no need to address the fairness prong of the International 
Shoe test in Daimler. 
Third, courts have traditionally analyzed contacts before reaching the fairness 
issue simply because it is more efficient to do so.  In Burger King v. Rudzewicz,290 
the Court held that where the minimum contacts prong of the International Shoe 
test has been met, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is presumptively fair.291  
Justice Ginsburg echoed this view in Daimler, observing that “[w]hen a corporation 
is genuinely at home in the forum [s]tate[,] . . . any second-step inquiry would be 
superfluous.”292 
Fourth, as discussed above, the majority in Daimler did acknowledge fairness 
considerations in denying general jurisdiction.293  Although the majority’s 
conclusions on fairness supported its holdings, fairness concerns were not central to 
the outcome. 
C. Meaning of “At Home” 
The Daimler Court made clear that a corporation is presumptively at home, 
and hence subject to general jurisdiction, in its state of incorporation and where it 
has its principal place of business.294  At the same time, the Court acknowledged 
that there may be additional factual scenarios where a defendant is “at home” in a 
state, citing Perkins as an example.295  Daimler thus offers the lower courts little 
guidance on when a corporation is at home beyond the two paradigm cases set forth 
in the opinion.  The issue of what additional facts might satisfy the at home 
criterion is thus likely to come back to the Court in the not too distant future. 
D. Too Big for General Jurisdiction? 
As Justice Sotomayor points out, the Daimler holding creates the anomalous 
situation whereby a large multinational firm with significant business activities 
outside of the forum state may escape the exercise of general jurisdiction, while a 
smaller company, whose principal place of business is within the forum, but whose 
business activities within the forum are far less than those of the multinational firm, 
may be subject to general jurisdiction.296  The majority did not dwell on this 
anomaly but rather stressed the need for simple, predictable jurisdictional rules that 
would permit out of state defendants “to structure their primary conduct with some 
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to 
suit.”297  The upshot is that large multinational firms will be amenable to general 
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jurisdiction in a very limited number of forums and will thus be “too big” for 
general jurisdiction. 
E. Individual Proprietors 
Also unclear is the impact of Daimler’s at home standard on the exercise of 
general jurisdiction over individual proprietors who are neither domiciled in the 
forum state nor present there when served with process.  Given that an individual 
could conduct systematic and continuous business operations in multiple states at 
the same time, that individual may well be faced with the kind of “unacceptably 
grasping” jurisdictional reach that Daimler eschewed.298  At the same time, an 
individual doing business in only one location would be “at home” and hence 
subject to general jurisdiction in the state where the business is located.299 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Daimler redefines general jurisdiction and significantly limits its exercise 
involving claims arising outside of the United States against foreign corporations.  
Daimler also sounds the death knell for the corporate presence doctrine, whether 
defendants are domestic or foreign.  At the same time, Daimler makes clear that 
domestic corporations are always subject to general jurisdiction in their state(s) of 
incorporation and where they have their principal place of business, thus clarifying 
and simplifying a jurisdictional doctrine that for many generations lurked in the 
shadows.  The Court adopted the “at home” standard to create a measure of clarity 
and predictability for corporations engaged in interstate or international commerce.  
However, it may in the end have created more confusion than certainty and simply 
invited more litigation to clarify limits of general jurisdiction.  Under the old 
“doing business” test not every corporation “doing business” within a state is “at 
home” there.  Daimler, however, offers little guidance on where to draw the line. 
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